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Surveys and researches have indicated various factors leading to or instigating 
the rise of religious intolerance in Indonesia after the Reformasi in 1998. This 
study, however, aims to see intolerance and discrimination as something 
embedded in Indonesian ideology, i.e. Pancasila, which seems to be lacking in 
previous studies, including the studies on the connection between Pancasila 
and discriminative regulations implemented is several districts and provinces 
in Indonesia. The questions dealt with in this paper are the following: Why 
did religious radical groups able to exert their influence to the government 
and moderate Muslim majority in treating minorities? What are, if any, the 
constitutional and legal limits of religious freedom in Indonesia? This paper 
aims to scrutinize constitutional and legal documents, including the first pillar 
of Pancasila, to find their shortcomings in protecting religious freedom. This 
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paper argues that Pancasila has set Indonesia into religiously monotheistic 
state, which provided the government the necessary tool to force non-theistic, 
polytheistic, and non-monotheistic religions to modify their theological beliefs 
in order to be accepted as recognized or official religions. Pancasila also justifies 
the existence of favoritism to certain religions deemed fit to this ideology. 
Berbagai survei dan penelitian telah menunjukkan berbagai faktor yang 
menyebabkan atau memicu bangkitnya intoleransi beragama di Indonesia 
setelah Reformasi tahun 1998. Penelitian ini ingin melihat intoleransi dan 
diskriminasi sebagai sesuatu yang secara tak sadar tertanam dalam ideologi 
Indonesia, yaitu Pancasila. Tema ini tampaknya kurang menjadi perhatian 
dalam studi sebelumnya, termasuk studi tentang hubungan antara Pancasila 
dan peraturan diskriminatif yang diterapkan di beberapa kabupaten dan 
provinsi di Indonesia. Pertanyaan yang dibahas dalam artikel ini diantaranya 
adalah: Mengapa kelompok-kelompok radikal keagamaan dapat mempengaruhi 
pemerintah dan mayoritas umat Muslim yang moderat dalam bersikap terhadap 
kelompok minoritas? Apa, jika ada, batasan konstitusional dan legal kebebasan 
beragama di Indonesia? Artikel ini bertujuan untuk meneliti dokumen-
dokumen konstitusional dan hukum, termasuk pilar pertama Pancasila, untuk 
menemukan kekurangan dalam melindungi kebebasan beragama. Artikel ini 
berargumen bahwa Pancasila telah menetapkan Indonesia menjadi negara 
monoteistik religius, yang memberikan pemerintah piranti yang diperlukan 
untuk memaksa agama-agama non-teistik, politeistis, dan non-monoteistik 
untuk memodifikasi keyakinan teologis mereka agar diterima sebagai agama 
yang diakui atau resmi. Pancasila juga membenarkan keberadaan favoritisme 
untuk agama-agama tertentu yang dianggap cocok dengan ideologi ini.
Keywords: Pancasila; Religious freedom; Theology; Favoritism; Constitution
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Introduction
After the Reformasi 1998, as reported by a number of studies1, the number 
of incident of religion intolerance in Indonesia has been increasing. 
The closing of Yasmin and Philadelphia Churches; the attack and 
displacement of Shi’ite community in Sampang; the recurrence attack 
and discrimination towards Ahmadiyya community in several places in 
Indonesia are among the examples. Attack, discrimination, other kind of 
violation of religious rights of Ahmadiyya and Shi’ite community even 
still continue sporadically until today. The most obvious symbols of this 
discrimination are Transito shelter in Mataram, West Nusa Tenggara 
and Puspa Agro shelter in Sidoarjo, East Java. In Transito, around 240 
displaced Ahmadis have been living in two halls since 2006. Each family 
has been living poorly in 2x3 meter room separated with curtain from 
other family. In Puspa Agro, around 200 Shi’ite members from Sampang 
Madura have been living there since 2012. These two places can be called 
“living monuments” of discrimination and intolerance towards religious 
minorities. Before settling down and solving the case of Ahmadiyya in 
Transito and Shi’ah Sampang in Puspa Agro, it seems to be difficult to 
say that the government has done enough to protect the rights of religious 
minorities. Before removing these two monuments, the negative report 
of religious life in Indonesia will probably appear repetitively every year.
Some scholars2 indicated that it is the weakness of law enforcers, 
1 Melissa Crouch, “Religious Regulations in Indonesia: Failing Vulnerable Groups”, 
Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs, Vol. 43 No. 2 (2009), 53-103; Jessica Soedirgo, 
“Informal Networks and Religious Intolerance: How Clientelism Incentivizes the 
Discrimination of the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia”, Citizenship Studies, No. 22 No. 2 (2018), 
191-207; Zainal Abidin Bagir, “Advocacy for religious freedom in democratizing Indonesia”, 
The Review of Faith & International Affairs, Vol. 12 No. 4 (2014), 27-39.
2 Jacques Bertrand, Nationalism and ethnic conflict in Indonesia, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004; Gerry Van Klinken, Communal violence and democratization in Indonesia 
Small town wars, London: Routledge, 2009; Ashutosh Varshney (ed.), Collective violence in 
Indonesia, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010.  
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particularly the police, judge, and government apparatus, that contributed 
significantly to the occurrence of intolerant acts in several years and places 
in Indonesia. Some people directed their attention specifically to the 
existence of groups commonly called “vigilante groups” such as the FPI 
(Front of Defenders of Islam) as the one that mostly responsible for those 
acts of religious intolerance. One of the key questions to those groups is 
“Why are religious radicals, who represent less than one percent of the 
population, having such success in changing Indonesia from a nation 
that has long based its identity on religious, cultural, and ethic pluralism 
to one facing growing and, in many levels, state-sanctioned intolerance?”3 
Is it true that they have successfully changed the contour of religiosity 
in Indonesia? There are also some scolars who try to see inter and 
intra religious conflicts in Indonesia from international perspective by 
connecting these conflict and the Middle East conflicts or the global rise 
of radicalism; they have certain repercussion in the rise of conservatism 
and hostility towards those considered as deviant or foreign or simple 
different other. Oddly enough, there are also group of people, such as the 
LPPI (Institute for Islamic Study and Research), who blame the victims 
by saying that it is the aggressive and provocative activities of religious 
minorities that trigger the attacks to these religious communities.4 
The above studies have contributed in explaining the causes of religious 
intolerance in Indonesia, but there is something to be missing; no study 
tries to see the intolerance as an inherent problem of Indonesian system 
3 Mary E. McCoy, “Purifying Islam in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: Corporatist 
Metaphors and the Rise of Religious Intolerance”, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 2 
(2013), 275-315.
4 Robin Bush and Budhy Munawar-Rachman, “NU and Muhammadiyah: Majority Views 
on Religious Minorities in Indonesia”, in Johan Saravanamuttu and Bernhard Platzdasch 
(eds.), Religious diversity in Muslim-majority states in Southeast Asia: areas of toleration and conflict. 
Singapore: ISEAS, 2014, p. 30; Ahmad Najib Burhani, “Fundamentalism and Religious 
Dissent: the LPPI’s Mission to Eradicate the Ahmadiyya in Indonesia.” Indonesia and the 
Malay World. Vol. 44 No. 129 (2016): 145-164.
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of government, a problem that is embedded in its ideology of Pancasila 
and its constitution. There is no study that try to see the connection 
between Pancasila or Indonesian Constitution and discriminative 
regulations implemented in several districts and provinces in this 
country.5 In the context of the protection of religious freedom, most of 
academic and advocacy studies see that there is no problem related to 
Indonesian constitution and also the ideology of Pancasila. They come to 
conclusion that Indonesian 1945 constitution and ideology of Pancasila 
have strongly guaranteed religious freedom as clearly stated, for instance, 
in the Article 28 E and 29. 
In contrast to the above studies, this article intends to see the relation 
between Indonesian constitution, which contains the ideology of 
Pancasila, and the emergence of discriminative regulations and acts of 
intolerance in Indonesia. The questions that will be dealt with are the 
following: Is there any holes in the constitution that inspire or make 
possible for the issuance of discriminative and intolerance regulations 
or bylaws in Indonesia? Based on the constitution, what are the limits of 
religious freedom? Are the limits inherently embedded in the constitution 
or are they merely from political interpretation of the constitution? What 
kind of limitation of religious freedom instigated by the constitution? 
This article argues that the basis and root of discriminative and 
5 Sita Hidayah (2010; 2012) and Ismatu Ropi (2016) try to make an initial effort to 
comprehend this issue. However, the conclusion of their studies show that this issue emerges 
as a consequence of different interpretation of the constitution and Pancasila. For the 
present author, it is a mild or soft or ambiguous conclusion. See Sita Hidayah, “Translating 
‘Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa’: An amenable religious ideology”, in Pancasila’s contemporary 
appeal: Re-legitimizing Indonesia’s founding ethos, eds. Thomas J. Conners, et. al., p. 239-254. 
Yogyakarta: Sanata Dharma University Press, 2010; Sita Hidayah, “The politics of religion: 
The invention of “agama” in Indonesia”. Kawistara, Vol. 2 No. 2 (2012): 121-139; Ismatu 
Ropi, “Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa, the State and the Politics of Religious (In)Tolerance: 
Understanding Contemporary Religious Life through Past Debates on the State-Religion 
Relationship,” in Religion, Law and Intolerance in Indonesia, Tim Lindsey and Helen Pausacher 
(eds.), New York: Roudledge, 2016: 132-157.
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intolerant regulations and bylaws in Indonesia is embedded in the 1945 
Constitution, particularly article 29 section one (“The state is based on 
Ketuhanan yang maha esa”), and the first pillar of Pancasila, Ketuhanan 
Yang Maha Esa.
The first pillar of Pancasila: Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa
Pancasila, a combination of two old Javanese words Panca and sila 
that literally means five principles, is the national ideology or official 
philosophy of Indonesia state.6 In Indonesian constitution, this ideology 
is written in the preamble of UUD (Undang-undang Dasar) 1945. 
Pancasila consists of five pillars or principles, namely: 1) Ketuhanan 
yang maha esa (Belief in the one and only god); 2) Kemanusiaan yang 
adil dan beradab (Just and civilized humanity); 3) Persatuan Indonesia 
(The unity of Indonesia); 4) Kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat 
kebijaksanaan, dalam permusyawaratan perwakilan (democracy led 
by God’s guidance and wisdom arising out of deliberations amongst 
representatives); and 5) Keadilan bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia (Social 
justice for all Indonesian people).
Out of these five pillars, the longest debate among the founding fathers 
of Indonesia during and after the independence of this country in 1945 
is the first pillar. The debate revolved around the wording and position 
of this pillar among other pillars. In Sukarno’s draft of Pancasila, instead 
of becoming the first pillar, “belief in the one and only god” was the fifth 
pillar. The wording also did not incline to endorse monotheistic religion. 
It is only ketuhanan (belief in god), without any inclination towards 
monotheistic, non-theistic, or polytheistic religions.
6 Because of the prominent place of Pancasila, there are two holidays related to this 
ideology: The birth of Pancasila day (Hari Lahir Pancasila) on June 1 and the Divine power 
of Pancasila day (Hari Kesaktian Pancasila) on October 1.
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The wording of Ketuhanan yang maha esa is actually also a revised version 
of the draft agreed upon by members of the drafting team of Indonesian 
philosophy, called Piagam Jakarta (Jakarta Charter).7 The wording of 
the first pillar of Pancasila in the Jakarta Charter is “Ketuhanan, dengan 
kewajiban menjalankan syari’at Islam kepada pemeluk-pemeluknya” (Belief in 
god, with the obligation for adherents of Islam to carry out the shari’a).
In the context of religiously plural society of Indonesia, the first pillar 
of Pancasila as written in Piagam Jakarta was felt by some Indonesian to be 
bias to Islam. As stated in the history of Pancasila, there was a call during 
the night before the declaration that some delegation from eastern part of 
Indonesia lobbied and met Muhammad Hatta, a member of the drafting 
team, and expressed the feeling of some Christians in the eastern part of 
Indonesia. They would not join Indonesian state that would be declared 
soon if there is no revision of the first pillar of Pancasila. Responding to 
this complaint, Hatta then lobbied some members of the drafting team, 
particularly the Islamist group, to revise the wording of the first pillar for 
the sake of unity of Indonesia. The wording of Ketuhanan yang maha esa 
is the final version agreed upon by the drafting team. From the process of 
drafting, the wording and position of each pillar are a political consensus 
and compromise of the founding fathers, usually seen as consisting of 
three main groups: nationalist, Islamist, and non-Muslims.
Some Muslim scholars often see that the final wording of the first 
pillar of Pancasila is a gift and sacrifice of Indonesian Muslims for the 
unity of Indonesia. By sacrificing the ideal political objective of Muslim 
politician at that time, the unity of Indonesia can be preserved. Some 
people argued that Pancasila is similar to the covenant of the prophet 
Muhammad with diverse religious community in Madinah to live and 
7 The drafting team consists of nine members. They are Sukarno, Mohammad Hatta, 
A.A. Maramis, Abikoesno Tjokrosoejoso, Abdul Kahar Muzakir, Agus Salim, Achmad 
Subardjo, Wahid Hasyim, and Muhammad Yamin.
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protect each other in religiously plural society. This covenant is named 
the Madinah Charter (Mi >tha>q al-Madi>nah) or the Constitution of Medina 
(Dustu>r al-Madi>nah) or the S }ah}i >fat al-Madi>nah. It is an agreement made by 
the prophet Muhammad shortly after his arrival at Medina (then known 
as Yathrib) in 622 CE or 1 H. There are some interesting points on 
that archaic document. First, Islam and Muhammad were not placed in 
divine status above other religions or communities. Second, all religions 
and beliefs, including indigenous belief systems (“pagan”), were fully 
accepted as members of the “state” and treated equally before the law. 
There is no supremacy and favoritism to Islam. Third, the term umma 
in this document is not exclusively understood as Muslim community 
or “nation of Islam”, but it refers to all tribes and groups in the charter, 
including Jewish people. This is different from the meaning of umma 
in our contemporary which often understood as “community of God” 
or “Muslim people” or “theocratic community, instituted by God to 
supplant the traditional kinship-based tribes [qaum]”.8
To convince other Muslims who are still reluctant to accept Pancasila 
or those still struggle to return to Jakarta Charter or even those who 
constitutionally tried to reinsert the seven-deleted words from the first 
pillar, some Muslim scholars such as Ahmad Syafii Maarif9 have tried 
to convince their co-religious brothers that the first pillar of Pancasila is 
no other than Islamic doctrine of tauhid (oneness of god). Therefore, it 
does not deviate from Islam or against the teachings of Islam. In some 
sense, Pancasila can be seen as a “contemporary Medina Charter” for 
Indonesian people. It was formed during the time of Revolution by a 
number of people representing diverse religious and ethnic background 
8 R. Stephen Humphreys, Islamic History: a Framework for Inquiry, London: I B Tauris, 
1999, 92.
9 Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Islam dan Pancasila Sebagai Dasar Dasar Negara: Studi Tentang 
Perdebatan Dalam Konstituante, Bandung: Mizan, 2017.
The limits of religious freedom in Indonesia: ...(Abdul Mu’ti, Ahmad Najib Burhani)
119
and also competing political inclinations. However, they agreed with a 
common term to make Indonesia based on Pancasila. It does not give 
privilege and favouritism to certain religion and ethnicity, but all people 
must believe in “One and Only God” (Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa).
Pancasila, as national ideology, has been supported by various 
Muslim organizations, including Muhammadiyah. During the Congress 
in Makassar in 2015, Muhammadiyah reemphasized its position on 
Pancasila. It is summarized in the declaration of “Negara Pancasila sebagai 
Da>r al-A <hdi wa al-Shaha>dah” (Pancasila State as the Abode of Covenant 
and the Space of Testimony). For Muhammadiyah, this NKRI (United 
Nation of Republic of Indonesia) or this Pancasila State is “founded 
based on a noble national philosophy and in line with Islamic teachings” 
and all pillars of Pancasila are in essence “in harmony with the values 
of Islamic teachings”. Pancasila, the result of Indonesian consensus, 
according to Din Syamsuddin, former chairman of Muhammadiyah, “is 
a common platform and common denominator of Indonesia that can 
accommodate the shared values of various religions to guarantee the life 
of the people in national unity”.10
Pancasila and state-created religions
In Indonesian politics, as discussed in the previous part of this article, 
Pancasila is a consensus agreed upon by religiously diverse people of 
Indonesia immediately before the independence of this country. As 
a consensus, certainly people could not achieve their highest goals as 
individual or group. They had to compromise their ideals in order to find 
common ground to live and work together. For Indonesia, particularly 
during the the early stages after the independence, Pancasila provided 
10 Hasnan Bachtiar, “Da >r al-‘Ahd wa al-Shaha >dah: Muhammadiyah’s Contemporary 
Ijtiha>d of Siyar and Pancasila”,  MA Thesis, College of Arts and Social Sciences, The 
Australian National University, 2018, 36-37.
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a common philosophy for Indonesian people regardless their religious, 
ethnicity or any other primordial backgrounds. 
What they did not expect or aware of at that stage was the fact that 
the first pillar of Pancasila, Ketuhanan yang maha esa, does not only make 
Indonesia a religious state, instead of secular or Islamic one, but more 
than that it has defined Indonesia clearly as a religiously monotheistic 
state. Furthermore, although Indonesian people have diverse religious 
affiliation, the term yang maha esa (the one and only) seems to indicate 
a theological bias of dominant religious groups, namely Islam and 
Christianity, in politics during the time of the invention of Pancasila. 
Even within Muslim and Christian community themselves, as shown in 
the works of scholars and proponent of these religions, the term yang 
maha esa has been understood and interpreted differently based on their 
theological inclination. Sita Hidayah has listed a number of translation 
of Ketuhanan yang maha esa used by scholars. Among them are “Belief in 
God”, “The Belief in One God”, “the Belief in One Supreme God”, “the 
Belief in Oneness of God,” “The Belief in the One and Only God”, “the 
Belief in the Divine Omnipotence”, “Belief in All-embracing God”, “the 
Belief in One Divine Lordship”, “The Unity of God”, and “A Supreme 
Godhead”.11
In the context of religious minority, this term seems to exclude 
religions that do not belong to the category of monotheistic religions such 
as Buddhism (often perceived as non-theistic religion) and Hinduism 
(often seen as polytheistic religion). Therefore, although Pancasila has 
been hailed as one of the main foundations for guaranteeing religious 
freedom, the wording of its first pillar contains elements that go against 
the principles of religious freedom or, to be more precise, limit the scope 
of religious freedom in Indonesia.
11 Sita Hidayah, “Translating ‘Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa”…, 239-240.
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Hinduism and Buddhism: route to become official religions
From early historical record of religiosity in Indonesia, it was only three 
religions considered as “recognized” one and have certain department or 
directorate in the Ministry of Religion. They are Islam, Christianity, and 
Catholicism. Although Hinduism and Buddhism have longer history in 
this country, they were not recognized yet as part of official religions 
because they are seen as not fit enough with the concept of yang maha esa 
as emboldened in the first pillar of Pancasila.
Hinduism and Buddhism started to be recognized as two additional 
official religions in 1958 after modifying their theological beliefs 
in accordance with the first pillar of Pancasila, i.e. changing from 
polytheistic and non-theistic religions into monotheistic ones. The name 
of Indonesian Hindu’s “one and only” God, i.e. Sang Hyang Widi Wasa, 
is not known in Hinduistic theological concept in India, the country of 
origin of Hinduism. Monotheistic Hinduism and believing in one and 
only god is a unique and distinctive of theological concept of Indonesian 
Hinduism or commonly called Parisada Hindu Dharma.12 This religion 
must comply with the first pillar of Pancasila in order to be recognized 
and become official religion in this religiously monotheistic state.
Buddhism also had the same experience, modifying religious doctrines 
in order to comply with the demand of the state and to be recognized 
as an official religion. As a non-theistic religion, the concept of God in 
Buddhism is not as concrete or clear as other religions. Leo Suryadinata 
12 Regarding Hindu’s conception of God, June McDaniel summarizes as follows: 
“shamanic or folk Hinduism (emphasizing animism and nature deities), Vedic Hinduism 
(polytheistic), Vedanta (monistic), Yoga (non-theistic or monistic, sometimes dualistic), 
Dharma (polytheistic), and Bhakti (usually henotheistic, with a high god over minor gods, 
and sometimes monotheistic, with other gods as emanations or manifestations)”. See June 
McDaniel, “Agama Hindu Dharma Indonesia as a New Religious Movement: Hinduism 
recreated in the image of Islam,” Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions, 
Vol. 14 No. 1 (2010), 94.
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elaborates nicely about the concept of God in Buddhism by quoting the 
debate between Bhikkhu Narada of Sri Lanka and Bhikkhu Ashin Ashin 
Jinarakkhita of Indonesia as follows: “Bhikkhu Narada of Sri Lanka 
strongly disagreed with Bhikkhu Ashin, arguing that ‘there is no god in 
Buddhism’. He refused to accept Bhikkhs’s Ashin’s ‘theistic Budhhism’, 
which is common in the Mahayana of Indonesia and Nepal”.13 However, 
because of the demand of Indonesian government Indonesian Buddhism 
declared Sang Hyang Adhi Buddha as their one and only God. This 
name is taken from the tenth century old Javanese text, called Sang 
Hyan Kamahayanikan. The role of Bhikkhu Ashin Jinarakkhita was very 
significant in defining and constructing this theistic Buddhism. 
More detail story on the controversy of Adi Buddha is narrated by 
Karel Steenbrink. Responding to this unique and distinctive theological 
concept of Indonesian Buddhism, a “Sri Lankan monk Narada, who had 
visited Indonesia in 1934 and later again in 1959 and 1969… wrote quite 
often to Parwati, a secretary to Jinarakkhita, and urged her: “Please, tell 
your teacher that there is no God in Buddhism”. Jinarakkhita’s reaction 
was that this could be true for Ceylonese Buddhism, but Indonesian 
Buddhism cherished a distinct flavour of several blends of Buddhism 
and would not practise its religion without the concept of a supreme 
divinity”.14 
Confucianism and indigenous religions
The fate of Confucianism is interesting. This ancestral belief was 
perceived as religion during Sukarno administration and even included 
in one of six recognized religions as in the law no. 1/PNPS/1965. During 
13 See Leo Suryadinata, The Culture of the Chinese Minority in Indonesia, Singapore: Times 
Books International, 1997, 178. 
14 Karel A. Steenbrink, “Buddhism in Muslim Indonesia,” Studia Islamika, Vol. 20 No. 
1 (2013), 11.
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Suharto administration, Confucianism was initially recognized by the 
government, but then, using the Presidential Instruction No. 14 in 1967, 
it was banned as religion and the religious activities related to this belief 
were forbidden. During the time of Abdurrahman Wahid’s presidency, 
the prohibition of Confucianism was revoked with the issuance of the 
presidential decree No. 6 in 2000 and this religion has the same rights as 
other five official religions in Indonesia.15 
As elaborated by Leo Suryadinata, the reason why the government 
withdraw its recognition to Confucianism is interesting.
One explanation is that initially the military-led government 
needed support from various religious groups in its struggle against 
the communists, who were presumably atheists. However, the support 
of Matakin [Supreme Council of Indonesian Confucian Religion] was 
considered to be in contradiction to the government assimilationist 
policy. The second possible explanation is that if Confucianism is 
officially recognized as a religion, it might lead to the eventual recognition 
of Chinese religious rights: the Confucian religion cold be taught in the 
school as a legitimate religious subject, Confucian holidays (Chinese 
holidays) would be recognized as Indonesian holidays. This would be 
against the assimilationist goal prescribed by the Suharto government.16
Before it was banned in 1967, to be recognized as a state religion, 
Confucianism also must follow the state-mandated theology, i.e. becoming 
monotheistic religion by believing one and only god. In its country of 
origin, Confucianism is a belief system, not considered as a religion, 
that does not clearly declare the name of god for this belief. Because the 
conception of one and only god is a requirement in Indonesia, followers 
of Confucianism then “appointed” Thian as their one and only god.
15 Ahmad Najib Burhani, Menemani Minoritas: Paradigma islam tentang Keberpihakan dan 
Pembelaan kepada yang Lemah, Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2019, 41-43.
16 Leo Suryadinata, The Culture of the Chinese Minority in Indonesia…, 164-165.
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It is not only the conception of deities that must abide the regulation 
from religiously monotheistic state of Indonesia, the conception of religion 
in this country is also strongly influenced by monotheistic religion of Islam 
and Christianity. Although not stated in the constitution or in Pancasila, 
but in Indonesian context, what is called religion must have prophet 
and a holy scripture. Following this “unwritten” rule17, Confucianism 
then appointed Confucius as the prophet of that religion and Buku Yang 
Empat (Su Si) as its holy book. The place of congregation for Confucians is 
called Lithang (Litang, Ceremonial Hall). The priesthood in this religion 
is classified into three ranks: Haksu, Bunsu, and Kausing.18  
The “unwritten” definition of religion has far wider consequences 
other than modification of theological beliefs in Hinduism, Buddhism, 
and Confucianism. For indigenous or ancestral religions such as 
Parmalim, Sunda Wiwitan, and Kaharingan, their belief system is not 
simply ignored as a kind or a system of religion, but the followers of 
that beliefs are often seen as worshippers of stones or woods which is 
usually called as animism and dynamism. These belief systems have been 
preserved as an object of tourism and for a long time these beliefs were 
under the Ministry of Tourism, not under the Ministry of Religion. 
Because of the perception that they are uncivilized and not having 
17 Picard and Madinier mention that the definition of religion can be found in TAP 
(People’s Assembly Resolution) MPR No. 2 in 1960. In her article, Sita Hidayah also 
refers to this Resolution on the definition of religion. Agama or religion, as defined by this 
Resolution, must have a holy scripture, a prophet, and affirms the oneness of God. My 
study of that Resolution, however, does not find the definition of religion there. It is also 
often stated that the definition of agama can be found in Tap MPR No IV/MPR/1978 that 
is followed by an Instruction from the Ministry of Religion (Instruksi Menag) No 4 Tahun 
1978. My study also does not find the definion of religion there. What is stated in the TAP 
MPR No. XXVII/MPRS/1966 is the term “diakui” (recognized) for certain religions. See 
Michel Picard and Rémy Madinier, The Politics of Religion in Indonesia: Syncretism, Orthodoxy, 
and Religious Contention in Java and Bali, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011, 11; Sita Hidayah, 
“The politics of religion”…, 8.
18 Leo Suryadinata, The Culture of the Chinese Minority in Indonesia…, 167.
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religion yet, the followers of ancestral beliefs have become object of mission 
from mainstream and recognized religions such as Islam, Christianity, 
Hinduism, and Buddhism. At national level, indigenous beliefs of 
Indonesia, formally called aliran or penghayat kepercayaan, are now under 
the Ministry of Education and Culture. The move from the Ministry of 
Tourism to the Ministry of Education and Culture is often seen as an 
improvement or a better treatment; not perceiving them as an object of 
tourism, but as part of the richness of Indonesian culture. However, these 
beliefs are often seen merely as part of culture in general, not specifically 
perceived as religions. These beliefs are perceived of preserving Indonesian 
local wisdoms, but not a comprehensive system of belief and certainly not 
a complete way of life as provided by religions. Furthermore, some activists 
of religious freedom accused this move as a way or a trick from dominant 
religion to bring the followers of indigenous religions to the “right path”, 
i.e. dominant religions. This perception is further justified by the statement 
in the Law No. 1/PNPS/ 1965 which states: “Towards the believers of 
Faith, the government is trying to channel them towards a healthy view and 
towards a belief in One and Only God”.19
Pancasila and religious intolerance
Besides the impact of the wording of the first pillar of Pancasila towards 
non-mainstream religions, this pillar has also inspired the government to 
intervene religious affairs by becoming a main source for regulations on 
religion, including the controversial Law on the Defamation of Religion 
Law, also known as Blasphemy Law, no. 1/PNPS/1965 and religious 
bylaws in a number of districts and provinces in Indonesia. Similar to 
the way the first pillar creates boundaries of the acceptable conception 
19 Trisno Sutanto, “Diskriminasi terhadap Penghayat: Sampai Kapan?”, a paper presented 
at the seminar on “Pluralitas dan Minoritas dalam Konteks Kebangsaan”, Jakarta, LIPI, 1 
December 2016.
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of deity in the framework Indonesian religiosity, the politics behind the 
drafting of this pillar, i.e. giving favorite to dominant religious groups 
and compromising religious rights of religious minorities for the sake 
of harmony and unity, influences or inspires similar type of regulations 
on religion. The bias of religious regulations can be said as indirectly 
correlate to the first pillar. What can be inferred from the first pillar in 
this context is to allow favoritism and inclination to certain groups.  
This kind of favoritism has now become a mental construct or frame of 
thought among Indonesian people. In Papua and West Papua provinces, 
where Christianity is a dominant religion, there were efforts by religious 
activists there to implement favoritism to Christianity by making kota Injili 
(City of Bible) and making local regulations that more incline to support 
Christian mission.20 For political and diplomatic goal, i.e. Helsinki 
agreement, Aceh province has even become an “Islamic province” that 
implemented shari’a law, including wilayah hisbah or religious police. 
Wearing hijab becomes mandatory in that province, regardless religious 
affiliation of people there. Hudud is partly implemented for those who 
violates Islamic law. After Aceh and Papua, some Hindu people in 
Bali have tried to follow the step of these two provinces by proposing 
regulation that give favoritism to Hinduism.21
Even in the provinces dominated by Muslims, such as East Java, 
certain sect or denomination of Islam have tried to create regulations 
that give favoritism to the majority. Situbondo district, for instance, has 
called itself as a city of shalawat nariyah. What does it mean? Shalawat is 
a tradition specifically within Nahdlatul Ulama community. Although 
20 See “Upaya menjadikan Manokwari sebagai ‘Kota Injil’ pertama di Indonesia”. 
https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-40695899; “Polemik Perda Manokwari Kota 
Injil”, https://tirto.id/polemik-perda-manokwari-kota-injil-ddsi (Accessed, 9 May 2019).
21 See “Perda Desa Adat, Menyayomi Pengawal Budaya Bali”, http://www.balipost.com/
news/2019/04/04/72291/Perda-Desa-Adat,Mengayomi-Pengawal...html (Accessed, 9 May 
2019).
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it is accepted by other Muslim groups, such as Muhammadiyah, but it 
is more identical with NU culture. Creating a slogan for a city based on 
certain religious inclination, let alone a specific group, seems to overlook 
other religious community that live together in the area. Furthermore, 
the slogan does not only call this city as kota shalawat, but kota shalawat 
nariyah which refers to a more specific community within Islam and 
within Nahdlatul Ulama, i.e. the traditionalist of the NU of East Java.22
In short, the first pillar of Pancasila has influenced and nurtured a 
mental construct and frame of thought of favoritism and, in some cases, 
sectarianism among religious people. In order to appease the majority, 
for instance, compromising religious rights of minority groups is often 
taken by government in its discretions. The philosophy behind this one 
is “harmony over religious freedom”. 
Harmony and religious freedom are two key terms in the debate about 
religiosity in Indonesia. Most of the people agree with religious harmony, 
including by limiting religious rights for the sake of social order. Religious 
freedom is a term hated by a number of religious groups. A number of 
people, including in the Muhammadiyah and the NU, do not see the 
issue of Ahmadiyya is part of religious freedom. They see that as a case 
of defamation of Islam. As stated by Amin Djamaluddin, Ahmadiyya 
is not and cannot be included in the issue of religious freedom. This 
view finds its echo in Muslim communities in Indonesia, including two 
largest Muslim organizations, NU and Muhammadiyah.23 The dream of 
harmony as expected by activists of religious freedom seems to be different 
from the illusion of harmony of religious mainstream. For the latter, the 
22 See “Di Bumi Shalawat Nariyah, FKS Situbondo Berpacu Kembangkan Desa Sehat”, 
https://www.timesindonesia.co.id/read/176931/20180717/145138/di-bumi-shalawat-
nariyah-fks-situbondo-berpacu-kembangkan-desa-sehat/products.html (Accessed, 9 May 
2019).
23 Ahmad Najib Burhani, “Fundamentalism and Religious Dissent”…, 145-164.
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harmony that they want to create is based on restriction and cutting off 
any differences. For the former, the harmony is based on co-existence and 
mutual respect in a plural society. The term is the same, but the meaning 
and the way to implement it is different.
The case of prohibition of peringatan ‘Ashura organized by Shi’ite 
community in Bogor in 2015 is an example of compromising religious 
rights of minority group in order to appease the majority under the 
rhetoric of maintaining social order.24 Also, as reflected in the judicial 
review of the Blasphemy Law No. 1/PNPS/1965, the Constitutional 
Court at the end found that this law is still needed to maintain order 
and religious harmony in Indonesia.
Conclusion
The root of religious intolerance can be found in Indonesian constitution 
and its ideology of the state, Pancasila. The discriminative treatment 
towards religious minorities has embedded there since the establishment 
of this country. The first pillar of Pancasila Ketuhanan yang maha esa, stated 
two times in the constitution; in the preamble and in the article 29, defines 
Indonesia as a religiously monotheistic state, not a secular or Islamic state. 
In order to be recognized as official religions in this religiously monotheistic 
state, polytheistic and non-theistic must modify their theological beliefs.
This philosophy has been implemented towards religious minorities 
such as Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. Sadly, this modification 
has not worked yet in the context of indigenous religions. They are 
often seen merely as belief system, not religion. And they have become 
a subject of mission or an object of tourism. However, changing the first 
pillar of Pancasila is something difficult even to imagine it. Changing 
24 During my interview with the mayor of Bogor, Bima Arya, in his office on ..., he said 
that he issued the decree in order to avoid chaos because some people threaten to take the 
law into their own hands if the government did not prohibit the event.
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Pancasila is like changing the state in total. The existence of the holes in 
Pancasila, perhaps for now, just for the awareness of people, particularly 
in academic discourse.
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